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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be
released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the
time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of
the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of
Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v.
Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS, INC. et al. v.
LEE, SUPERINTENDENT OF PORT AUTHORITY POLICE certiorari to the
united states court of appeals for the second circuit No. 91-155.
Argued March 25, 1992-Decided June 26, 1992

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which owns and
operates three major airports in the New York City area and
controls certain terminal areas at the airports (hereinafter
terminals), adopted  a regulation forbidding, inter alia, the
repetitive solicitation of money  within the terminals.  However,
solicitation is permitted on the sidewalks outside the terminal
buildings.  Petitioner International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., a not-for-profit religious corporation whose
members, among other things, solicit funds in  public places to
support their movement, brought suit seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the
regulation deprived them of their First Amendment rights.  The
District Court granted petitioner summary judgment, concluding
that the terminals were public fora, and that the regulation
banning solicitation failed because it was not narrowly tailored
to support a compelling state interest.  The Court of Appeals
reversed as here relevant.  It determined that the terminals are
not public fora, and found that the ban on solicitation was
reasonable.

Held:

   1. An airport terminal operated by a public authority is a
non-public forum, and thus a ban on solicitation need only
satisfy a reasonableness standard.  Pp.4-10.

    (a) The extent to which the Port Authority can restrict
expressive activity on its property depends on the nature of the
forum.

Regulation of traditional public fora or designated public fora
survives only if it is narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling
state interest, but limitations on expressive activity conducted
on any other government-owned property need only be reasonable to
survive.  Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn.,
460 U.S. 37, 45, 46.  Pp.4-5.

    (b) Neither by tradition nor purpose can the terminals be
described as public fora.  Airports have not historically been

made available for speech activity.  Given the lateness with
which the modern air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly
qualifies as a property that has "immemorially . . . time out of
mind" been held in the public trust and used for the purposes of
expressive activity. See Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515.  Nor have airport operators
opened terminals to such activities, see Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, 473  U.S. 788, 802, as evidenced by
the operators' frequent and continuing litigation in this area.
Pp.6-7.

     (c) That speech activities may have historically occurred at
"transportation nodes" such as rail and bus stations, wharves,
and Ellis Island is not relevant.  Many of these sites
traditionally have had private ownership.  In addition, equating
airports with other transportation centers would not take into
account differences among the various facilities that may affect
the extent to which such facilities can accommodate expressive
activity.  It is unsurprising to find differences among the
facilities.  The Port Authority, other airport builders and
managers, and the Federal Government all share the view that
terminals are dedicated to the facilitation of efficient air
travel, not the solicitation of contributions.  Pp.7-10.

2. The Port Authority's ban on solicitation is reasonable.
Solicitation may have a disruptive effect on business by slowing
the path of both those who must decide whether to contribute and
those who must alter their paths to avoid the solicitation.  In
addition, a solicitor may cause duress by targeting the most
vulnerable persons or commit fraud by concealing his affiliation
or shortchanging purchasers.  The fact that the targets are
likely to be on a tight schedule, and thus are unlikely to stop
and complain to authorities, compounds the problem.  The Port
Authority has determined that it can best achieve its legitimate
interest in monitoring solicitation activity to assure that
travelers are not interfered with unduly by limiting solicitation
to the sidewalk areas outside the terminals.

That area is frequented by an overwhelming percentage of airport
users, making petitioner's access to the general public quite
complete.

Moreover, it would be odd to conclude that the regulation is
unreasonable when the Port Authority has otherwise assured access
to a universally travelled area.  While the inconvenience caused
by petitioner may seem small, the Port Authority could reasonably
worry that the incremental effects of having one group and then
another seek such access could prove quite disruptive.  Pp.10-12.
925 F.2d 576, affirmed in part.

Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined.  O'Connor, J.,
filed a concurring opinion.  Kennedy, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, in Part I of which Blackmun, Stevens,
and Souter, JJ., joined.  Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., joined.

  Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.

  In this case we consider whether an airport terminal operated
by a public authority is a public forum and whether a regulation
prohibiting solicitation in the interior of an airport terminal
violates the First Amendment.

  The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute. Petitioner
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON) is
a not-for-profit religious corporation whose members perform a
ritual known as sankirtan.  The ritual consists of -`going into
public places, disseminating religious literature and soliciting
funds to support the religion."'  925 F. 2d 576, 577 (CA2 1991).
The primary purpose of this ritual is raising funds for the
movement. Ibid.

  Respondent Walter Lee, now deceased, was the police
superintendent of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
and was charged with enforcing the regulation at issue.  The Port
Authority owns and operates three major airports in the greater
New York City area:  John F. Kennedy International Airport
(Kennedy), La Guardia Airport (La Guardia), and Newark
International Airport (Newark).  The three airports collectively
form one of the world's busiest metropolitan airport complexes.
They serve approximately 8% of this country's domestic airline
market and more than 50% of the trans-Atlantic market.  By
decade's end they are expected to serve at least 110 million
passengers annually.  Id., at 578.

  The airports are funded by user fees and operated to make a
regulated profit.  Id., at 581.  Most space at the three airports
is leased to commercial airlines, which bear primary
responsibility for the leasehold.  The Port Authority retains
control over unleased portions, including La Guardia's Central
Terminal Building, portions of Kennedy's International Arrivals
Building, and Newark's North Terminal Building (we refer to these
areas collectively as the "terminals").  The terminals are
generally accessible to the general public and contain various
commercial establishments such as restaurants, snack stands,
bars, newsstands, and stores of various types.  Id., at 578.
Virtually all who visit the terminals do so for purposes related
to air travel.  These visitors principally include passengers,
those meeting or seeing off passengers, flight crews, and
terminal employees.  Ibid.

The Port Authority has adopted a regulation forbidding within the
terminals the repetitive solicitation of money or distribution of
literature.  The regulation states: "1.  The following conduct is
prohibited within the interior areas of buildings or structures
at an air terminal if conducted by a person to or with passers-by
in a continuous or repetitive manner: "(a)  The sale or
distribution of any merchandise, including but not limited to
jewelry, food stuffs, candles, flowers, badges and clothing. "(b)
The sale or distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets, books
or any other printed or written material. "(c)  Solicitation and
receipt of funds."  Id., at 578-579.

  The regulation governs only the terminals; the Port Authority
permits solicitation and distribution on the sidewalks outside
the terminal buildings.  The regulation effectively prohibits
petitioner from performing sankirtan in the terminals.  As a
result, petitioner brought suit seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief under 42 U. S. C. 1983, alleging that the
regulation worked to deprive them of rights guaranteed under the
First Amendment.  The District Court analyzed the claim under the
"traditional public forum" doctrine.  It concluded that the
terminals were akin to public streets, 721 F. Supp. 572, 577
(SDNY 1989), the quintessential traditional public fora.  This
conclusion in turn meant that the Port Authority's terminal
regulation could be sustained only if it was narrowly tailored to
support a compelling state interest.  Id., at 579. In the absence
of any argument that the blanket prohibition constituted such
narrow tailoring, the District Court granted petitioner summary
judgment.  Ibid.

/* In Constitutional law classes in law schools, the instructors
note that the type of review that the court finds applicable
decides the case. Thus, if the case is reviewed under a standard
of reasonableness, the government wins in virtually every case,
but if the standard is "narrowly drawn to support a compelling
interest" the government usually loses. */

  The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.
925 F. 2d 576 (1991).  Relying on our recent decision in United
States v. Kokinda, 497 U. S. ___ (1990), a divided panel
concluded that the terminals are not public fora.  As a result,
the restrictions were required only to satisfy a standard of
reasonableness.  The Court of Appeals then concluded that,
presented with the issue, this Court would find that the ban on
solicitation was reasonable, but the ban on distribution was not.
Petitioner sought certiorari respecting the Court of Appeals'
decision that the terminals are not public fora and upholding the
solicitation ban. Respondent cross-petitioned respecting the
court's holding striking down the distribution ban.  We granted
both petitions, 502 U. S. ___ (1992), to resolve whether airport
terminals are public fora, a question on which the Circuits have
split and on which we once before granted certiorari but
ultimately failed to reach.  Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los
Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U. S. 569 (1987).

  It is uncontested that the solicitation at issue in this case
is a form of speech protected under the First Amendment. Heffron
v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.
S. 640 (1981); Kokinda, supra, at ___ (citing Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 629 (1980));
Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U. S.
781, 788-789 (1988).  But it is also well settled that the
government need not permit all forms of speech on property that
it owns and controls.  United States Postal Service v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S. 114, 129 (1981); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976).  Where the government is acting as a
proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather than acting
as lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its action
will not be subjected to the heightened review to which its
actions as a lawmaker may be subject.  Kokinda, supra, at ___
(plurality opinion) (citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896 (1961)).  Thus, we have upheld a ban
on political advertisements in city- operated transit vehicles,
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974), even
though the city permitted other types of advertising on those
vehicles.  Similarly, we have permitted a school district to
limit access to an internal mail system used to communicate with
teachers employed by the district.  Perry Education Assn. v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U. S. 37 (1983).

  These cases reflect, either implicitly or explicitly, a
-forum-based- approach for assessing restrictions that the
government seeks to place on the use of its property. Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788,
800 (1985).  Under this approach, regulation of speech on
government property that has traditionally been available for
public expression is subject to the highest scrutiny.  Such
regulations survive only if they are narrowly drawn to achieve a
compelling state interest.  Perry, supra, at 45.  The second
category of public property is the designated public forum,
whether of a limited or unlimited character - property that the
state has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the
public.  Ibid.  Regulation of such property is subject to the
same limitations as that governing a traditional public forum.
Id., at 46.  Finally, there is all remaining public property.
Limitations on expressive activity conducted on this last
category of property must survive only a much more limited
review.  The challenged regulation need only be reasonable, as
long as the regulation is not an effort to suppress the speaker's
activity due to disagreement with the speaker's view.  Ibid.

  The parties do not disagree that this is the proper framework.
Rather, they disagree whether the airport terminals are public
fora or nonpublic fora.  They also disagree whether the
regulation survives the -reasonableness- review governing
nonpublic fora, should that prove the appropriate category.  Like
the Court of Appeals, we conclude that the terminals are
nonpublic fora and that the regulation reasonably limits
solicitation.

  The suggestion that the government has a high burden in
justifying speech restrictions relating to traditional public
fora made its first appearance in Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 515, 516 (1939). Justice
Roberts, concluding that individuals have a right to use "streets
and parks for communication of views," reasoned that such a right
flowed from the fact that "streets and parks . . . have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions."  We confirmed this observation in Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U. S. 474, 481 (1988), where we held that a residential
street was a public forum.

/* One might argue that this analysis is circular. Airports have
not existed since "times immemorial" therefore they are not
dedicated as a public forum. That means that any new area,
perhaps a lunar shuttle terminal will not be a public forum
either. */

  Our recent cases provide additional guidance on the
characteristics of a public forum.  In Cornelius we noted that a
traditional public forum is property that has as "a principal
purpose . . . the free exchange of ideas."  473 U. S., at 800.
Moreover, consistent with the notion that the government "like
other property owners - -has power to preserve the property under
its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated,"
Greer, supra, at 836, the govern- ment does not create a public
forum by inaction.  Nor is a public forum created "whenever
members of the public are permitted freely to visit a place owned
or operated by the Government."  Ibid.  The decision to create a
public forum must instead be made "by intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse."  Cornelius, supra, at
802. Finally, we have recognized that the location of property
also has bearing because separation from acknowledged public
areas may serve to indicate that the separated property is a
special enclave, subject to greater restriction. United States v.
Grace, 461 U. S. 171, 179-180 (1983).

  These precedents foreclose the conclusion that airport
terminals are public fora.  Reflecting the general growth of the
air travel industry, airport terminals have only recently
achieved their contemporary size and character.  See H.V.
Hubbard, M. McClintock, & F.B. Williams, Airports:  Their
Location, Administration and Legal Basis, 8 (1930) (noting that
the United States had only 807 airports in 1930).  But given the
lateness with which the modern air terminal has made its
appearance, it hardly qualifies for the description of having
-immemorially . . . time out of mind- been held in the public
trust and used for purposes of expressive activity. Hague, supra,
at 515.  Moreover, even within the rather short history of air
transport, it is only "[i]n recent years [that] it has become a
common practice for various religious and non-profit
organizations to use commercial airports as a forum for the
distribution of literature, the solicitation of funds, the
proselytizing of new members, and other similar activities."  45
Fed. Reg. 35314 (1980).  Thus, the tradition of airport activity
does not demonstrate that airports have historically been made
available for speech activity.

/* This seems to ingore that fact that persons travelled by horse
until the railroads came. Places like Grand Central Station
(alebit not government owned) were once the hubs of activity of
travel. Airports were not crowded in the 1930's, so persons
seeking a public audience would not go there. Now that airports
are crowded.... */

Nor can we say that these particular terminals, or airport
terminals generally, have been intentionally opened by their
operators to such activity; the frequent and continuing
litigation evidencing the operators' objections belies any such
claim.  See n.2, supra.  In short, there can be no argument that
society's time-tested judgment, expressed through acquiescence in
a continuing practice, has resolved the issue in petitioner's
favor.

  Petitioner attempts to circumvent the history and practice
governing airport activity by pointing our attention to the
variety of speech activity that it claims historically occurred
at various "transportation nodes" such as rail stations, bus
stations, wharves, and Ellis Island.  Even if we were inclined to
accept petitioner's historical account describing speech activity
at these locations, an account respondent contests, we think that
such evidence is of little import for two reasons.  First, much
of the evidence is irrelevant to public fora analysis, because
sites such as bus and rail terminals traditionally have had
private ownership.  See United Transportation Union v. Long
Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678, 687 (1982); H.R. Grant & C.W. Bohi,
The Country Railroad Station in America, 11-15 (1978); United
States Dept. of Transportation, The Intercity Bus Terminal Study
31 (Dec. 1984).  The development of privately owned parks that
ban speech activity would not change the public fora status of
publicly held parks.  But the reverse is also true.  The
practices of privately held transportation centers do not bear on
the government's regulatory authority over a publicly owned
airport.

  Second, the relevant unit for our inquiry is an airport, not
"transportation nodes" generally.  When new methods of
transportation develop, new methods for accommodating that
transportation are also likely to be needed.  And with each new
step, it therefore will be a new inquiry whether the
transportation necessities are compatible with various kinds of
expressive activity.  To make a category of -transportation
nodes,- therefore, would unjustifiably elide what may prove to be
critical differences of which we should rightfully take account.
The -security magnet,- for example, is an airport commonplace
that lacks a counterpart in bus terminals and train stations.
And public access to air terminals is also not infrequently
restricted - just last year the Federal Aviation Administration
required airports for a 4-month period to limit access to areas
normally publicly accessible.  See 14 CFR 107.11(f) (1991) and
United States Dept. of Transportation News Release, Office of the
Assis- tant Secretary for Public Affairs, January 18, 1991.  To
blithely equate airports with other transportation centers,
therefore, would be a mistake.

  The differences among such facilities are unsurprising since,
as the Court of Appeals noted, airports are commercial
establishments funded by users fees and designed to make a
regulated profit, 925 F. 2d, at 581, and where nearly all who
visit do so for some travel related purpose. Id., at 578.  As
commercial enterprises, airports must provide services attractive
to the marketplace.  In light of this, it cannot fairly be said
that an airport terminal has as a principal purpose "promoting
the free exchange of ideas." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).  To the contrary,
the record demonstrates that Port Authority management considers
the purpose of the terminals to be the facilitation of passenger
air travel, not the promotion of expression. Sloane Affidavit,
-11, 2 App. 464; Defendant's Civil Rule 3(g) Statement, -39, 2
App. 453.  Even if we look beyond the intent of the Port
Authority to the manner in which the terminals have been
operated, the terminals have never been dedicated (except under
the threat of court order) to expression in the form sought to be
exercised here: i.e., the solicitation of contributions and the
distribution of literature.

  The terminals here are far from atypical.  Airport builders and
managers focus their efforts on providing terminals that will
contribute to efficient air travel.  See, e.g., R. Horonjeff & F.
McKelvey, Planning and Design of Airports 326 (3d. ed.
1983)("[t]he terminal is used to process passengers and baggage
for the interface with aircraft and the ground transportation
modes").  The Federal Government is in accord; the Secretary of
Transportation has been directed to publish a plan for airport
development necessary "to anticipate and meet the needs of civil
aeronautics, to meet requirements of the national defense . . .
and to meet identified needs of the Postal Service."  49 U.S.C.
App. 2203(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also, 45 Fed. Reg. 35317
(1980) ("[t]he purpose for which the [Dulles and National
airport] terminal[s] was built and maintained is to process and
serve air travelers efficiently").  Although many airports have
expanded their function beyond merely contributing to efficient
air travel, few have included among their purposes the
designation of a forum for solicitation and distribution
activities.  See supra, at 7.  Thus, we think that neither by
tradition nor purpose can the terminals be described as
satisfying the standards we have previously set out for
identifying a public forum.

  The restrictions here challenged, therefore, need only satisfy
a requirement of reasonableness.  We reiterate what we stated in
Kokinda, the restriction "`need only be reasonable; it need not
be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation.'-  496
U. S., at ___ (plurality opinion) (quoting Cornelius, supra, at
808).  We have no doubt that under this standard the prohibition
on solicitation passes muster.

  We have on many prior occasions noted the disruptive effect
that solicitation may have on business. "Solicitation requires
action by those who would respond: The individual solicited must
decide whether or not to contribute (which itself might involve
reading the solicitor's literature or hearing his pitch), and
then, having decided to do so, reach for a wallet, search it for
money, write a check, or produce a credit card."  Kokinda, supra,
at ___; see Heffron, 452 U. S., at 663 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissent- ing in part).  Passengers who wish to avoid
the solicitor may have to alter their path, slowing both
themselves and those around them.  The result is that the normal
flow of traffic is impeded.  Id., at 653.  This is especially so
in an airport, where "air travelers, who are often weighted down
by cumbersome baggage . . . may be hurrying to catch a plane or
to arrange ground transportation."  925 F. 2d, at 582.  Delays
may be particularly costly in this setting, as a flight missed by
only a few minutes can result in hours worth of subsequent
inconvenience.

  In addition, face-to-face solicitation presents risks of duress
that are an appropriate target of regulation.  The skillful, and
unprincipled, solicitor can target the most vulnerable, including
those accompanying children or those suffering physical
impairment and who cannot easily avoid the solicitation.  See,
e.g., International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147, 159-163 (NDNY 1980), rev'd on other
grounds 650 F. 2d 430 (CA2 1981).  The unsavory solicitor can
also commit fraud through concealment of his affiliation or
through deliberate efforts to shortchange those who agree to
purchase.  506 F. Supp., 159-163.  See 45 Fed. Reg. 35314-35315
(1980). Compounding this problem is the fact that, in an airport,
the targets of such activity frequently are on tight schedules.
This in turn makes such visitors unlikely to stop and formally
complain to airport authorities.  As a result, the airport faces
considerable difficulty in achieving its legitimate interest in
monitoring solicitation activity to assure that travelers are not
interfered with unduly.

  The Port Authority has concluded that its interest in
monitoring the activities can best be accomplished by limiting
solicitation and distribution to the sidewalk areas outside the
terminals.  Sloane Supp. Affidavit, -11, 2 App. 514.  This
sidewalk area is frequented by an overwhelming percentage of
airport users, see id., at -14, 2 App. 515-516 (noting that no
more than 3% of air travelers passing through the terminals are
doing so on intraterminal flights, i. e. transferring planes).
Thus the resulting access of those who would solicit the general
public is quite complete.  In turn we think it would be odd to
conclude that the Port Authority's terminal regulation is
unreasonable despite the Port Authority having otherwise assured
access to an area universally traveled.

  The inconveniences to passengers and the burdens on Port
Authority officials flowing from solicitation activity may seem
small, but viewed against the fact that "pedestrian congestion is
one of the greatest problems facing the three terminals," 925 F.
2d, at 582, the Port Authority could reasonably worry that even
such incremental effects would prove quite disruptive.  Moreover,
"the justification for the Rule should not be measured by the
disorder that would result from granting an exemption solely to
ISKCON." Heffron, supra, at 652.  For if petitioner is given
access, so too must other groups.  "Obviously, there would be a
much larger threat to the State's interest in crowd control if
all other religious, nonreligious, and noncommercial
organizations could likewise move freely."  452 U. S., at 653.
As a result, we conclude that the solicitation ban is reasonable.

  For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the ban on solicitation in Port Authority terminals is
Affirmed.

  Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens,
and Justice Souter join as to Part I, concurring in the judgment.

  While I concur in the judgment affirming in this case, my
analysis differs in substantial respects from that of the Court.
In my view the airport corridors and shopping areas outside of
the passenger security zones, areas operated by the Port
Authority, are public forums, and speech in those places is
entitled to protection against all government regulation
inconsistent with public forum principles.  The Port Authority's
blanket prohibition on the distribution or sale of literature
cannot meet those stringent standards, and I agree it is invalid
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  The Port Authority's
rule disallowing in- person solicitation of money for immediate
payment, however, is in my view a narrow and valid regulation of
the time, place, and manner of protected speech in this forum, or
else is a valid regulation of the nonspeech element of expressive
conduct.  I would sustain the Port Authority's ban on
solicitation and receipt of funds.

I

  An earlier opinion expressed my concern that "[i]f our public
forum jurisprudence is to retain vitality, we must recognize that
certain objective characteristics of Government property and its
customary use by the public may control" the status of the
property.  United States v. Kokinda, 497 U. S. 720, 737 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).  The case before us does
not heed that principle.  Our public forum doctrine ought not to
be a jurisprudence of categories rather than ideas or convert
what was once an analysis protective of expression into one which
grants the government authority to restrict speech by fiat.  I
believe that the Court's public forum analysis in this case is
inconsistent with the values underlying the speech and press
clauses of the First Amendment.

  Our public forum analysis has its origins in Justice Roberts'
rather sweeping dictum in Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939); see also ante, at 6.
The doctrine was not stated with much precision or elaboration,
though, until our more recent decisions in Perry Education Assn.
v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37 (1983), and
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.
S. 788 (1985).  These cases describe a three part analysis to
designate government- owned property as either a traditional
public forum, a designated public forum, or a nonpublic forum.
Perry, supra, at 45-46; ante, at 5.  The Court today holds that
traditional public forums are limited to public property which
have as -`a principal purpose . . . the free exchange of ideas'-;
ante, at 6 (quoting Cornelius, supra, at 800), ante, at 1
(opinion of O'Connor, J.); and that this purpose must be
evidenced by a long-standing historical practice of permitting
speech.  Ante, at 7; ante, at 1-2 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).  The
Court also holds that designated forums consist of property which
the government intends to open for public discourse.  Ante, at 6,
citing Cornelius, supra, at 802; ante, at 2 (opinion of O'Connor,
J.).  All other types of property are, in the Court's view,
nonpublic forums (in other words, not public forums), and
government-imposed restrictions of speech in these places will be
upheld so long as reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.  Under this
categorical view the application of public-forum analysis to
airport terminals seems easy.  Airports are of course public
spaces of recent vintage, and so there can be no time-honored
tradition associated with airports of permitting free speech.
Ante, at 7.  And because governments have often attempted to
restrict speech within airports, it follows a fortiori under the
Court's analysis that they cannot be so-called -designated-
forums.  Ibid.  So, the Court concludes, airports must be
nonpublic forums, subject to minimal First Amendment protection.

  This analysis is flawed at its very beginning.  It leaves the
government with almost unlimited authority to restrict speech on
its property by doing nothing more than articulating a
non-speech-related purpose for the area, and it leaves almost no
scope for the development of new public forums absent the rare
approval of the government.  The Court's error lies in its
conclusion that the public-forum status of public property
depends on the government's defined purpose for the property, or
on an explicit decision by the government to dedicate the
property to expressive activity.  In my view,  the inquiry must
be an objective one, based on the actual, physical
characteristics and uses of the property.  The fact that in our
public-forum cases we discuss and analyze these precise
characteristics tends to support my position.  Perry, supra, at
46-48; Cornelius, supra, at 804-806; Kokinda, supra, at 727-729
(plurality opinion).

  The First Amendment is a limitation on government, not a grant
of power.  Its design is to prevent the government from
controlling speech.  Yet under the Court's view the authority of
the government to control speech on its property is paramount,
for in almost all cases the critical step in the Court's analysis
is a classification of the property that turns on the
government's own definition or decision, unconstrained by an
independent duty to respect the speech its citizens can voice
there.  The Court acknowledges as much, by reintroducing today
into our First Amendment law a strict doctrinal line between the
proprietary and regulatory functions of government which I
thought had been abandoned long ago.  Ante, at 4-5; compare Davis
v. Massachusetts, 167 U. S. 43 (1897); with Hague v. Committee
for Industrial Organization, supra, at 515; Schneider v. State,
308 U. S. 147 (1939); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104,
115-116 (1972).

  The Court's approach is contrary to the underlying purposes of
the public forum doctrine.  The liberties protected by our
doctrine derive from the Assembly, as well as the Speech and
Press Clauses of the First Amendment, and are essential to a
functioning democracy.  See Kalven, The Concept of the Public
Forum:  Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 14, 19.  Public
places are of necessity the locus for discussion of public
issues, as well as protest against arbitrary government action.
At the heart of our jurisprudence lies the principle that in a
free nation citizens must have the right to gather and speak with
other persons in public places.  The recognition that certain
government- owned property is a public forum provides open notice
to citizens that their freedoms may be exercised there without
fear of a censorial government, adding tangible reinforcement to
the idea that we are a free people.

  A fundamental tenet of our Constitution is that the government
is subject to constraints which private persons are not.  The
public forum doctrine vindicates that principle by recognizing
limits on the government's control over speech activities on
property suitable for free expression. The doctrine focuses on
the physical characteristics of the property because government
ownership is the source of its purported authority to regulate
speech.  The right of speech protected by the doctrine, however,
comes not from a Supreme Court dictum but from the constitutional
recognition that the government cannot impose silence on a free
people.

  The Court's analysis rests on an inaccurate view of history.
The notion that traditional public forums are property which have
public discourse as their principal purpose is a most doubtful
fiction.  The types of property that we have recognized as the
quintessential public forums are streets, parks, and sidewalks.
Cornelius, 473 U. S., at 802; Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474,
480-481 (1988).  It would seem apparent that the principal
purpose of streets and sidewalks, like airports, is to facilitate
transportation, not public discourse, and we have recognized as
much. Schneider v. State, supra, at 160.  Similarly, the purpose
for the creation of public parks may be as much for beauty and
open space as for discourse.  Thus under the Court's analysis,
even the quintessential public forums would appear to lack the
necessary elements of what the Court defines as a public forum.

  The effect of the Court's narrow view of the first category of
public forums is compounded by its description of the second
purported category, the so-called -designated- forum. The
requirements for such a designation are so stringent that I
cannot be certain whether the category has any content left at
all.  In any event, it seems evident that under the Court's
analysis today few if any types of property other than those
already recognized as public forums will be accorded that status.

  The Court's answer to these objections appears to be a recourse
to history as justifying its recognition of streets, parks, and
sidewalks, but apparently no other types of government property,
as traditional public forums.  Ante, at 7-8.  The Court ignores
the fact that the purpose of the public forum doctrine is to give
effect to the broad command of the First Amendment to protect
speech from governmen- tal interference.  The jurisprudence is
rooted in historic practice, but it is not tied to a narrow
textual command limiting the recognition of new forums.  In my
view the policies underlying the doctrine cannot be given effect
unless we recognize that open, public spaces and thorough- fares
which are suitable for discourse may be public forums, whatever
their historical pedigree and without concern for a precise
classification of the property.  There is support in our
precedents for such a view.  See Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U. S. 298, 303 (1974) (plurality opinion); Hague,
307 U. S., at 515 (speaking of "streets and public places" as
forums).  Without this recognition our forum doctrine retains no
relevance in times of fast-changing technology and increasing
insularity.  In a country where most citizens travel by
automobile, and parks all too often become locales for crime
rather than social intercourse, our failure to recognize the
possibility that new types of government property may be
appropriate forums for speech will lead to a serious curtailment
of our expressive activity.

  One of the places left in our mobile society that is suitable
for discourse is a metropolitan airport.  It is of particular
importance to recognize that such spaces are public forums
because in these days an airport is one of the few
government-owned spaces where many persons have extensive contact
with other members of the public.  Given that private spaces of
similar character are not subject to the dictates of the First
Amendment, see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507 (1976), it is
critical that we preserve these areas for protected speech.  In
my view, our public forum doctrine must recognize this reality,
and allow the creation of public forums which do not fit within
the narrow tradi- tion of streets, sidewalks, and parks.  We have
allowed flexibility in our doctrine to meet changing technologies
in other areas of constitutional interpretation, see, e.g., Katz
v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), and I believe we must do
the same with the First Amendment.

  I agree with the Court that government property of a type which
by history and tradition has been available for speech activity
must continue to be recognized as a public forum. Ante, at 7.  In
my view, however, constitutional protection is not confined to
these properties alone.  Under the proper circumstances I would
accord public forum status to other forms of property, regardless
of its ancient or contemporary origins and whether or not it fits
within a narrow historic tradition.  If the objective, physical
characteristics of the property at issue and the actual public
access and uses which have been permitted by the government
indicate that expressive activity would be appropriate and
compatible with those uses, the property is a public forum.  The
most important considerations in this analysis are whether the
property shares physical similarities with more traditional
public forums, whether the government has permitted or acquiesced
in broad public access to the property, and whether expressive
activity would tend to interfere in a significant way with the
uses to which the government has as a factual matter dedicated
the property.  In conducting the last inquiry, courts  must
consider the consistency of those uses with expressive activities
in general, rather than the specific sort of speech at issue in
the case before it; otherwise the analysis would be one not of
classification but rather of case-by-case balancing, and would
provide little guidance to the State regarding its discretion to
regulate speech.  Courts must also consider the availability of
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions in undertaking
this compatibility analysis.  The possibility of some theoretical
inconsistency between expressive activities and the property's
uses should not bar a finding of a public forum, if those
inconsistencies can be avoided through simple and permitted
regulations.

  The second category of the Court's jurisprudence, the so-called
designated forum, provides little, if any, additional protection
for speech.  Where government property does not satisfy the
criteria of a public forum, the government retains the power to
dedicate the property for speech, whether for all expressive
activity or for limited purposes only.  See ante, at 5; Perry,
460 U. S., at 45-46; Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U. S. 546 (1975).  I do not quarrel with the fact that speech
must often be restricted on property of this kind to retain the
purpose for which it has been designated.  And I recognize that
when property has been designated for a particular expressive
use, the government may choose to eliminate that designation.
But this increases the need to protect speech in other places,
where discourse may occur free of such restrictions.  In some
sense the government always retains authority to close a public
forum, by selling the property, changing its physical character,
or changing its principal use.  Otherwise the State would be
prohibited from closing a park, or eliminating a street or
sidewalk, which no one has understood the public forum doctrine
to require.  The difference is that when property is a protected
public forum the State may not by fiat assert broad control over
speech or expressive activities; it must alter the objective
physical character or uses of the property, and bear the
attendant costs, to change the property's forum status.

  Under this analysis, it is evident that the public spaces of
the Port Authority's airports are public forums.  First, the
District Court made detailed findings regarding the physical
similarities between the Port Authority's airports and public
streets.  721 F. Supp. 572, 576-577 (SDNY 1989).  These findings
show that the public spaces in the airports are broad, public
thoroughfares full of people and lined with stores and other
commercial activities.  An airport corridor is of course not a
street, but that is not the proper inquiry.  The question is one
of physical similarities, sufficient to suggest that the airport
corridor should be a public forum for the same reasons that
streets and sidewalks have been treated as public forums by the
people who use them.

  Second, the airport areas involved here are open to the public
without restriction.  Ibid.  Plaintiffs do not seek access to the
secured areas of the airports, nor do I suggest that these areas
would be public forums.  And while most people who come to the
Port Authority's airports do so for a reason related to air
travel, either because they are passengers or because they are
picking up or dropping off passengers, this does not distinguish
an airport from streets or sidewalks, which most people use for
travel.  See supra, at ---.  Further, the group visiting the
airports encompasses a vast portion of the public:  In 1986 the
Authority's three airports served over 78 million passengers.  It
is the very breadth and extent of the public's use of airports
that makes it imperative to protect speech rights there.  Of
course, airport operators retain authority to restrict public
access when necessary, for instance to respond to special
security concerns.  But if the Port Authority allows the uses and
open access to airports that is shown on this record, it cannot
argue that some vestigial power to change its practices bars the
conclusion that its airports are public forums, any more than the
power to bulldoze a park bars a finding that a public forum
exists so long as the open use does.

  Third, and perhaps most important, it is apparent from the
record, and from the recent history of airports, that when
adequate time, place, and manner regulations are in place,
expressive activity is quite compatible with the uses of major
airports.  The Port Authority's primary argument to the contrary
is that the problem of congestion in its airports' corridors
makes expressive activity inconsistent with the airports' primary
purpose, which is to facilitate air travel.  The First Amendment
is often inconvenient.  But that is besides the point.
Inconvenience does not absolve the government of its obligation
to tolerate speech.  The Authority makes no showing that any real
impediments to the smooth functioning of the airports cannot be
cured with reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.  In
fact, the history of the Authority's own airports, as well as
other major airports in this country, leaves little doubt that
such a solution is quite feasible.  The Port Authority has for
many years permitted expressive activities by the plaintiffs and
others, without any apparent interference with its ability to
meet its transportation purposes.  App. 462, 469-470; see also
ante, at 8 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).  The Federal Aviation
Authority, in its operation of the airports of the Nation's
capital, has issued rules which allow regulated expressive
activity within specified areas, without any suggestion that the
speech would be incompatible with the airports' business.  14 CFR
159.93, 159.94 (1992). And in fact expressive activity has been a
commonplace feature of our Nation's major airports for many
years, in part because of the wide consensus among the Courts of
Appeals, prior to the decision in this case, that the public
spaces of airports are public forums.  See, e.g., Chicago Area
Military Project v. Chicago, 508 F. 2d 921 (CA7), cert. denied,
421 U. S. 992 (1975); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F. 2d 619 (CA5
1981), cert. dism'd, 458 U. S. 1124 (1982); United States
Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United
States, 228 U. S. App. D.C. 191, 708 F. 2d 760 (1983); Jews for
Jesus, Inc. v. Board of Airport Com- m'rs, 785 F. 2d 791 (CA9
1986), aff'd on other grounds, 482 U. S. 569 (1987); Jamison v.
St. Louis, 828 F. 2d 1280 (CA8 1987), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 987
(1988).  As the District Court recognized, the logical
consequence of Port Authority's congestion argument is that the
crowded streets and sidewalks of major cities cannot be public
forums.  721 F. Supp., at 578.  These problems have been dealt
with in the past, and in other settings, through proper time,
place, and manner restrictions; and the Port Authority does not
make any showing that similar regulations would not be effective
in its airports.  The Port Authority makes a half-hearted
argument that the special security concerns associated with
airports suggest they are not public forums; but this position is
belied by the unlimited public access the Authority allows to its
airports.  This access demonstrates that the Port Authority does
not consider the general public to pose a serious security
threat, and there is no evidence in the record that persons
engaged in expressive activities are any different.

  The danger of allowing the government to suppress speech is
shown in the case now before us.  A grant of plenary power allows
the government to tilt the dialogue heard by the public, to
exclude many, more marginal voices. The first challenged Port
Authority regulation establishes a flat prohibition on "[t]he
sale or distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets, books or
any other printed or written material," if conducted within the
airport terminal, "in a continuous or repetitive manner."  We
have long recognized that the right to distribute flyers and
literature lies at the heart of the liberties guaranteed by the
Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment.  See, e.g.,
Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943).  The Port Authority's rule,
which prohibits almost all such activity, is among the most
restrictive possible of those liberties.  The regulation is in
fact so broad and restrictive of speech, Justice O'Connor finds
it void even under the standards applicable to government
regulations in nonpublic forums.  Ante, at 7-8.  I have no
difficulty deciding the regulation cannot survive the far more
stringent rules applicable to regulations in public forums.  The
regulation is not drawn in narrow terms and it does not leave
open ample alternative channels for communication. See Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989).  The Port
Authority's concerns with the problem of congestion can be
addressed through narrow restrictions on the time and place of
expressive activity, see ante, at 8 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).  I
would strike down the regulation as an unconstitutional
restriction of speech.